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JUDGE PRATT:

Thank you for joining us for a discussion of

[Vol 19

the very pertinent issue of survival and wrongful death actions
under § 1983.'

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

Wrongful death actions under §

1983 have proven to be a very complex issue in recent years.
"This

issue

has

'generated

considerable

confusion

and

disagreement' in the lower federal courts."6 Nevertheless, today
we have an esteemed panel worthy of addressing such a difficult
topic.
We will examine how

courts handle

questions of

survivorship of claims. The issue of survivorship of a claim under
§ 1983 arises when there is a death of a party in an unresolved

42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000) states in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. ...
Id
6 Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Survival and Wrongful Death Claims, 229
N.Y.L.J. 3 (2003) (citing Phillips v. Monroe County, 311 F.3d 369, 374 (5th Cir.
2002)).
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action. Surviving relatives frequently attempt to assert wrongful
death claims under § 1983. It is important to keep the survivorship
and wrongful death issues separate. We are fortunate to have the
esteemed Judge Victor Marrero on our panel.

In Banks v.

Yokemick,7 Judge Marrero addressed these issues in an extensive
opinion. We also have the plaintiff's lawyers who litigated Banks,
Richard Emery and his colleague, Ilann Maazel.
To put these issues in perspective, we must look to §
1988(a).' Generally, when discussing § 1988, everybody normally

7 177

F. Supp. 2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).

842 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (2000) provides:
Applicability of statutory and common law. The jurisdiction in
civil and criminal matters conferred on the district and circuit
courts [district courts] by the provisions of this Title, and of
Title "CIVIL RIGHTS," and of Title "CRIMES," for the
protection of all persons in the United States in their civil
rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and
enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so
far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but
in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are
deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable
remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the
State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or
criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent
with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be
extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and
disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the
infliction of punishment on the party found guilty.
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[Vol 19

thinks of fees, but fees are covered by subdivision (b). 9 Dean
Steinglass, please tell us how § 1988(a) operates.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

Section 1988(a) is a federal civil rights

choice of law statute. It creates a methodology for courts to fill the
gaps in federal law when they are hearing actions under § 1983 and
some of the other surviving Reconstruction Era civil rights acts,
such as § 1981' 0 an d § 1982."

Typically, the best way to

understand a statute is to read it. In the case of § 1988(a), reading
it is the worst way to understand it. It can be compared to the
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.

9 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides:
Attorney's fees. In any action or proceeding to enforce a
provision of sections 1977, 1977A, 1978, 1979, 1980, and
1981 of the Revised Statutes [42 USCS §§ 1981-1983, 1985,
1986], title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 USCS §§ 1681 et
seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 USCS §§ 2000d et
seq.], or section 40302 of the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs, except that in any action brought against a
judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's
judicial capacity such officer shall not be held liable for any
costs, including attorney's fees, unless such action was clearly
in excess of such officer's jurisdiction.
Id.
'0 Equal Rights Under the Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
" Property Rights of Citizens, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2000).
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2 held that under
The Supreme Court, in Burnett v. Grattan,"

§ 1988, which dates back to the Civil Rights Act of 1866," 3 there
are three steps in the analysis. The first step is to ask whether there
is a deficiency in federal law. 4 If there is a deficiency, the second
step is to look to the state in which the federal court is sitting and
borrow a suitable provision of state law." This is usually an easy
determination to make. On the other hand, the question of which
statute of limitations to borrow is less easily determined.

The

Supreme Court has frequently granted certiorari to determine
which statute of limitations theory should be applied.' 6 It can be
said that under § 1988(a) there is a deficiency inquiry, 7 a selection
of the appropriate state law inquiry," and an inconsistency
inquiry."' For this analysis, the federal court borrows a suitable
state policy unless the policy is inconsistent with § 1983's twin

468 U.S. 42 (1984).
13Civil Rights Act, ch 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (2000)).
14 Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48.
12

15Id.

Id. at 49-50 (citing Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975);
Bd. Of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); McDonald v. West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984)).
7
1d. at48.
16

18 Id.

'9Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48.
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goals of compensation and deterrence.
address

the issues

of deficiency,

[Vol 19
The court must then

suitability,

and

finally,

inconsistency. 2'

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

There is a possibility of a fourth

step if the federal court finds an inconsistency. Then what is the
court to do?

DEAN STEINGLASS:

If there is a finding of inconsistency,

then the court must decide what to do. If the court finds a need for
a policy, the court must search for one, and that raises the need for
a fourth step. This need to find a policy can create additional
problems for federal courts that may need to create federal law to
fill the void.

20

See Schwartz, supra note 6. "When federal law fails to establish a rule of

law necessary for litigation of a Section 1983 claim, 42 USC Section 1988(a)
directs the federal court to remedy the deficiency by applying the state rule, so
long as the state rule is not inconsistent with the policies of Section 1983." Id.
"[B]ecause survivorship of Section 1983 claims is not covered by federal law,
the federal court must apply the state law of survivorship, so long as the state
policy is not inconsistent with the Section 1983 policies of compensation and
deterring constitutional violations." Id.(citing Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S.
584 (1978)).
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This speaks to the question of

Sometimes there is an obvious deficiency, such as

when there is no federal statute of limitations for § 1983.2" But, it
is not always obvious that the federal law is deficient.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

It is difficult to assume that Congress

meant § 1983 cases to linger for decades and decades, so that
deficiency is obvious.2

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

Would you assert that the lack of a

federal law for survivorship of claim is an obvious deficiency as
well?

DEAN STEINGLASS:

There is an obvious lack of a federal

statute on survivorship. The Supreme Court, however, has offered
little guidance in this area. In Robertson v. Wegmann,23 the Court

21

Burnett, 468 U.S. at 48 (stating that "only 42 U.S.C. § 1986 contains a

statute of limitations").
22 Id. at 61 ("The willingness of Congress to impose a 1-year limitations period
in 42 U.S.C. § 1986 demonstrates that at least a 1-year period is reasonable").
23 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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held that there was a deficiency in federal law with respect to
whether an action survives the death of the plaintiff or the death of
the defendant.24 We are told to look to state law when this issue
arises."5

So, on survivorship issues we have a clear decision to

follow.

JUDGE MARRERO:

When there is a slight nuance in the

analysis, or the other side of the coin, before there is a
determination of deficiency, the court must first determine whether
or not federal law is adequate. The rationale is that if you examine
federal law and find there is an adequate remedy in place, there is
no need to determine the outcome of the next step, deficiency.
Again, it may be two sides of the same coin, but it might make the
analysis simpler.

Id. at 589. Federal law is 'deficient' because "[a]s we noted in Moor v.
County of Alameda, and as was recognized by both courts below, one specific
area not covered by federal law is that relating to 'the survival of civil rights
actions under § 1983 upon the death of either the plaintiff or defendant."' Id.
(quoting Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 702 (1973)).
25 Id. at 588 ("When federal law is thus 'deficient,' § 1988
instructs us to turn
to 'the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of
the [forum] State,' as long as these are 'not inconsistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States."') (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
24
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In the area of notice of claim,

sometimes there is no federal law on the issue. Steve Steinglass,
you argued this in Felder v. Casey. 6 In Felder, there was no
federal notice of claim provision, but still it was not held to be a
deficiency.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

Just because there is no federal policy in

the area, it does not mean there is a deficiency.

The Supreme

Court, in Felder, held that for there to be a deficiency, there have
to be "universally familiar aspects of litigation considered
indispensable to any scheme of justice" in general.28

But, in

survival claims, there is no federal survival policy that Congress
made applicable to § 1983.

This holding leads us to the more

interesting questions.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

Richard Emery and Ilann Maazel,

as the attorneys in Banks,29 a case originally brought against

26487 U.S. 131
27 Id. at 140.

(1988).

28 Id.
29

177 F. Supp. 2d at 239.
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multiple defendants,"° please describe how the offset issue in Banks
came about.

MR. MAAZEL:

There were two novel issues that we brought

before Judge Marrero. 3 ' One was whether loss of life damages
were available,32 the other was the setoff issue.33 We settled with
the City. Subsequently, the jury returned a verdict against Officer
Yokemick for $605,000. Officer Yokemick argued that there was

I (plaintiff sued the City of New York, Craig Yokemick, and nineteen
Id.
other individual defendants).
" The following comments were presented by Mr. Emery and Mr. Maazel.
Mr. Emery, in describing the facts of Banks, promises that the facts will make a
very abstract case more illustrative. In Banks, there are gaps in the federal law.
Judge Marrero, the presiding judge in Banks, will discuss at a later time the
underlying federal concepts of § 1983.
Banks is really a very simple case. An officer pursued a young man
who was on a bicycle. The officer wanted to arrest him. The young man was
getting away from the officer, so the officer threw his radio and hit the young
man in the back of the head. The young man subsequently died. Banks, 177 F.
Supp. 2d at 243-44. Although the facts are quite straightforward, there are a
number of nuances to this. There was a denial of care prior to his death. Id.
The family asserted a substantive due process claim on behalf of the young
man's mother for this denial of care and for the excessive force that resulted in
his death. Id.
Mr. Maazel stated that the plaintiff brought suit against the City of New
York and against a number of police officers. Id. at 243. The plaintiffs settled
the case with every defendant except for Officer Yokemick. During the trial
against Officer Yokemick, the plaintiffs argued that there was a variety of
damages available. One was Kenneth Banks' pain and suffering before he died.
Id. Another was the cost of the funeral and associated expenses. Banks, 177 F.
Supp. 2d at 243. Third was a new concept to the Second Circuit, damages for
the loss of Kenneth Banks' life itself. Id. (explaining loss of life damages do not
exist under New York law).
32 Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
" Id. at 243.
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an automatic setoff for the $750,000 that was awarded by the City
in the settlement. Further, he asserted that under New York law,
this conclusion would be valid, 34 reasoning that the plaintiff
already received $750,000 and should get nothing more.
Additionally, he noted that if the jury awarded $1,000,000 to
plaintiff, it would be appropriate to receive only $250,000 because
the City already settled for $750,000.36 The plaintiff argued that
the New York law did not apply if one utilized the three-step
analysis as suggested by Dean Steinglass

7

First, we looked to federal law; does federal law speak to
the issue of setoff? We argued before Judge Marrero that there
was precedent in an admiralty case, admiralty being the
quintessential federal common law. In McDermott, Inc. v Amclyde
& River Don Castings, Ltd.,38 the Court held that you do not look
to the amount that was settled by the defendants who are out of the
case, but look only at the allocation of fault between the remaining

34
35
36

Id. The settlement with the City was for $750,000 plus fees. Id.
See N.Y. GEN. OBL. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 2001).
Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 254.

37 See supra text accompanying
3 511 U.S. 202 (1994).

notes 14-20.
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defendants and the defendants who settled.39

[Vol 19
Thus, if you

determine the percentage of fault allocated to the remaining
defendant, for example, eighty percent responsible, and the
defendants who have settled are determined to be twenty percent
responsible, the court would then deduct twenty percent from the
jury verdict. The remainder would be the amount recovered from
the jury trial. This is the allocation apportion and share rule" as
opposed to the New York pro tanto setoff rule.4 ' Our argument
was that if there is a federal common law of setoff, it should apply
to this case; the Supreme Court agreed, so we did not need to
advance to the second step to determine if there was a state law
when federal law was unavailable.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

Judge Marrero, in this case the

plaintiffs relied on federal law.42 I suppose that you could have
held that there is federal law governing the setoff issue and,
therefore, the federal court did not have to look to state law. But,

'90 Id. at 204.
4 Id. at 210.
4' See N.
42

Y.GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney 2001).
Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 242-43.
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you did not. Although there was federal law, you held that there
was a deficiency.
-

3

I believe this raises a more pervasive problem

judges doing the same with other issues as well.. For example,

sometimes there is a question raised about tolling the statute of
limitations in a case with a federal
concealment.44

issue of fraudulent

Even though there is federal law on this issue,

federal courts have often relied on state tolling law. 5 In Banks,
there was a law dealing with the impact of the setoff,46 but you
decided that there was a deficiency. One can surmise that you did
not rely on the previous case because it was in an admiralty
context.47

43

Id. at 263.

See, e.g., Dohra v. Alcon, No. 92 C 2624, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10173,
**6-8 (N.D. 111. July 25, 1994) (holding the fraudulent concealment statute did
not toll the products liability statute of repose); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v.
McCoy, 995 F.2d 649, 651 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that, on remand, if the
District Court found fraudulent concealment, claims could proceed even though
the statute of limitations had elapsed).
41 See, e.g., Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131
(9th
Cir. 2001) (explaining that federal courts will apply state tolling law as long as
it is not inconsistent with federal law); Conerly v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
623 F.2d 117 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding in § 1981 claims the state tolling law
applied where it is not inconsistent with the Constitution or federal law).
46 Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 254 ("Banks argues that . . . the setoff rule
applicable
to this case derives from federal common law. .
47
McDermott, 511 U.S. at 201.
41
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[Vol 19

This case is still before the court, so it

might be inappropriate for me to say too much about it given we
have the plaintiff here, but not the defendant. 8 There has not been
a final judgment, and I still have proceedings before me in this
case.

In very brief summary, the court found that there was

federal law in McDermott, which was an admiralty case, which
required a process of allocating culpability.4 9 At the time the
defendants introduced the defense of setoff, they had pled state law
setoff. In ruling that the state setoff rule did not apply, the court
had not considered the federal rule."

If the court were to adopt the

federal rule, requiring the allocation of culpability, it would have
been quite impossible, as it had not been argued throughout the
trial.

I determined that in order to actually apply the federal

process of allocation of culpability, it would be necessary for the
parties to stipulate to the issue of culpability, or conversely, if the
parties did not stipulate, the court would be required to decide it at
trial.

The defendant was invited to participate in this discussion.
See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
50.Banks, 177
F. Supp. 2d at 263.
48
49
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It appears that the court initially

found a deficiency, so it turned to the state law. When it found the
state law to be inconsistent with the policy in § 1983, it was forced
to adopt a federal rule, which, I would guess, brought the court
right back to McDermott.' Is that fairly accurate? Is that how the
court found itself on step four?

JUDGE MARRERO:
it did apply.

No, I believe as I understood McDermott,

I determined that there was a federal rule that

pertained to the set of facts before the court. The difficulty was
that the parties had not presented the issue in that context to the
court in briefing the matter because the defense had not pled
McDermott. The defense in Banks pled state law,52 which I later
determined was inapplicable. 3

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

It appears to me that the application

of this principle could be very difficult.

5' McDermott, 511 U.S. at 217.
52

Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 243.

" Id. at 263.
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It could be, and that is why it required,

after the fact, the determination that perhaps a new trial might be
necessary.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

There is the potential that the

plaintiff could wind up with a windfall, or the remaining defendant
could wind up with a break, depending on how it plays out. The
overall point is that it is not always obvious whether there is a
deficiency in the federal law; and furthermore, if there is a
deficiency, is it still necessary to determine whether the state law is
consistent with § 1983 policies?

JUDGE MARRERO:

In Banks, it was not clear on its face.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

Let us now turn our focus to

survival and wrongful death decisions. I have an impression, and
perhaps I am incorrect, that the decisions are not always clear as to
whether a survival or wrongful death claim is before the court. It
could be that the plaintiff's attorney had not distinguished them
sufficiently.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol19/iss3/7
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I do agree that frequently plaintiffs'

attorneys do not distinguish the claims. There are two different
clusters of issues surrounding survival and wrongful death claims.
Survival policies determine whether the claim of the litigant
survives the litigant's death or whether death abates the claim. The
traditional measure of damages in survival actions is the amount
that the decedent would have been awarded had he not perished. 4
Thus, the damages are those that have accrued from the time of the
complained of incident until the time of death." Wrongful death
damages, on the other hand, are the damages that accrue to
survivors as a result of the death of the decedent.56 The underlying
cause of action and the complained of conduct are the same, but in
survival damage, the court must address the loss of earnings,
medical expenses, conscious pain and suffering, and in most
jurisdictions, punitive damages. 7 On the wrongful death claim, the
court must address the loss of support, loss of inheritance, loss of

54

Hon. George C. Pratt & Martin A. Schwartz, 18th Annual Section 1983 Civil

Rights Litigation, 1 PRACTISING LAW INST. 584 (2002).
16
57

Id.
Id. at 587.
Id.
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[Vol 19

society, and in a number of states, mental anguish and grief, and
often punitive damages? 8

Some might mistakenly see this as

double recovery, but in fact it is two distinct recoveries to
compensate two different interests for the same underlying
constitutional claim.
The remarkable thing about survival and wrongful death
measures of damages is that these remedial issues are in virtually
every § 1983 case involving an alleged wrongful killing, but they
are rarely addressed.

The Supreme Court has never fully

addressed wrongful death damages. On two occasions, certiorari
had been granted, only to be dismissed, as the Court found that
certiorariwas improvidently granted. 9
Interestingly, virtually every circuit has developed its own
unique approach to these issues.6" Further, state policies play a big

58 Id.

59 See, e.g., Jefferson v. City of Tarrant, 522 U.S. 75 (1997) (holding that the
lower court decision was not a final judgment); Jones v. Hildebrant, 432 U.S.
183 (1977) (holding that the petition for certiorari was mooted after oral
arguments).
6See, e.g., Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[lt is the law of
this circuit that individuals who are within the class of people entitled to recover
under Texas's wrongful death statute have standing to sue under § 1983 for their
own injuries resulting from the deprivation of decedent's constitutional rights");
Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205, 1236 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Where the

constitutional deprivation sought to be remedied in a Section 1983 action causes
death and the applicable state law would deem the action to survive or would
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role in defining how the § 1983 wrongful death action will
proceed, and state policies differ widely in these areas.6'

The

tactical decision that a lawyer will make in one jurisdiction will be
different than the tactical decision that same lawyer would make in
an adjoining jurisdiction in another state, both in the same circuit.
From a plaintiffs perspective, there is an infinitely broad
range of damages available on either a survival or a wrongful death
claim. A plaintiff s lawyer would argue that this is a case in which
it would be appropriate to borrow state law.

If state law had

limitations, a plaintiffs lawyer might choose to either seek other
sources of law or choose to adopt only some portions of state law,
arguing that other portions of the same state law violated the
inconsistency clause.

Those portions in violation

inconsistency clause would have to be rejected.

of the

This analysis

would be very situational. The facts of a case and the impact of
state and federal law would all have to be understood in great
depth before an argument could proceed.

allow recovery for the damage claim at issue, courts generally apply the state
law").
6! Pratt & Schwartz, supra note 54, at 585-89.
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Therefore, it is imperative to

separate the issues of survival and wrongful death and not fall into
the common trap of lumping them together. We must understand
that a survival claim survives a plaintiffs death, but a wrongful
death action only begins at the time a plaintiff dies. Further, we
understand that if there is a deficiency in the federal law, a federal
judge must look to state survival statutes. When the attorneys in
Banks argued that there was no federal law, the federal court
turned to the New York state survival law62 but it was found to be

62

N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §11-3.3 (McKinney 2001) provides:
(a) Where an injury causes the. death of a person the damages
recoverable for such injury are limited to those accruing
before death and shall not include damages for or by reason of
death, except that the reasonable funeral expenses of the
decedent, paid by the estate or for the payment of which the
estate is responsible, shall be recoverable in such action. The
damages recovered become part of the estate of the deceased.
(b) Nothing contained herein shall affect the cause of action
existing in favor of the next of kin under 5-4.1, subject to the
following:
(1) Such cause of action and the cause of action, under this
section, in favor of the estate to recover damages may be
prosecuted to judgment in a single action; a separate verdict,
report or decision shall be rendered as to each cause of action.
(2) Where an action to recover damages for personal injury
has been brought, and the injured person dies, as a result of the
injury, before verdict, report or decision, his personal
representative may enlarge the complaint in such action to
include the cause of action for wrongful death under 5-4.1.
(3) Where an action to recover damages under this section and
a separate action for wrongful death under 5-4.1 are pending
against the same defendant, they may be consolidated on the
motion of either party.
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inconsistent with the policy of § 1983.63

MR. EMERY:

That was, in fact, what we argued. The anomaly

that came up in Banks was that there was an inadequate
compensatory scheme from the plaintiffs point of view.6

It was

recognized by Judge Marrero's decision that the problem was
greater than just an inadequate compensatory scheme.65 Under
New York law, a survival claim is terminated at the time of death,
and under most circumstances, a wrongful death claim is not worth
much. The only instance in which there is adequate compensation
is when the deceased plaintiff is very valuable economically."

Id.

63

Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 249. The court explained:

On its face and as construed by New York courts, the state's
survival claim law does not evince an objective to secure
compensation designed to protect these broader non-economic
interests that inure to the benefit of both the decedent and the
larger community. In other words, the interests the state law
seeks to promote are principally the financial needs the
decedent's estate and its intended beneficiaries. These values
do not encompass the whole expanse of intangible, more
social and individual interests, such as enjoyment of life, that
inherently derive from the person of the victim and that § 1983
protects from unlawful deprivation.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
64 177 F. Supp. 2d at 249.
65

Id. at 249-50.

66

Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
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Banks was not such a person. Banks was a young man who was
not earning much money.67
The facts and circumstances of our case necessitated that
our argument rely on the determination that although federal law
was deficient,68 New York law was too inadequate to rely on.69
Moreover, the policies underlying § 1983, compensation and the
need to deter and punish those who do not comply with
constitutional rights mandated that the court look at federal law
anew. Judge Marrero's opinion confirmed our argument.7

67

This personal characterization was made by the speaker, Richard Emery,

who is Banks' attorney.
68 Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 249-50.
69 id.
70

Id. at 249.
Here, the particular interest asserted and the fundamental
constitutional right sought to be vindicated is Banks's Fourth
Amendment right not to be sulijected to use of excessive force
by police that caused his loss of life. The right to enjoyment
of life without its unlawful curtailment has an intrinsic worth
that necessarily exceeds the dollars-and-cents value of the
decedent to his beneficiaries. For, implicit in the legislative
history and philosophy of § 1983 is that the life interest the
statute protects is not just the private economic interest of the
injured person himself to enjoy his own life, but the much
more fundamental public interest of the rest of society in that
the life of any individual not be ended by the lawless conduct
of state agents. To this extent, in a measure of damages under
the federal statutory scheme, a state rule's quantification of the
value of a particular person's life would be fundamentally
flawed insofar as it counted alike whether the individual died
of natural causes or was killed unlawfully by the state's own
hand. The life wrongfully foreshortened is doubly
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In the analysis, there was a need to look to

state law and the underlying policies that § 1983 was to promote.
In this instance it was clear. New York precedent explicitly denies
loss of life as an element of a cause of action or as elements of
damages to be awarded.7

In Banks, the court interpreted New

York's Estate Powers and Trust Law Section 11-3.3. 7'

In

interpreting this law, New York courts have held that only
economic interests were to be compensated when calculating
damages. The courts have made it absolutely clear that, to the
extent federal law promoted other interests, New York law would
be inconsistent with those goals.73

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

When examining different state

rulings in response to recovery of damages for the surviving
plaintiff, we see a variety of limitations imposed. Some states may

shortchanged if that singular quantum of loss is discounted in
the official reckoning of the person's social worth.
Id.
7"See Sand v. Chapin, 656 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1997);
Kordonsky v. Andrst, 568 N.Y.S.2d 117, 119 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1991).
72 Banks, 177 F. Supp. 2d at 249-50.
73
Id. at 251-52.
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have a maximum dollar limitation.74 Some might not permit the
awarding of punitive damages,75 while others might award only
punitive damages.76

In New York, the law does not permit

damages for loss of enjoyment of life. But, it appears the New
York cases draw a distinction between two types of situations. In
the first instance, the plaintiff brings the claim and subsequently
dies for reasons not having to do with the alleged wrongdoing. In
the second instance, the plaintiffs allegation is that the defendant's
wrongdoing caused the death.

My impression is that the

limitations we discussed are much less likely to be imposed in
cases where the defendant's conduct caused the death of a plaintiff.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

I believe you are correct. Robertson v.

Wegmann,77 is the first major case in this area. Robertson is a case
in which the plaintiff died during the pendency of the litigation

71 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Heffner, 421 A.2d 629 (1980)
(noting
Pennsylvania's $15,000 limit).
75 See, e.g., Bass by Lewis v. Wallentsein, 769 F.2d 1173, 1190 (7th Cir.

1985) (noting that both New York and Illinois do not permit punitive damage
awards).
76

See, e.g., Carter v. City of Birmingham, 444 So. 2d 373 (Ala. 1983) (noting

Alabama awards only punitive damages).
77 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
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The

Supreme Court, in Carlson v. Green,9 subsequently held that
survival of the administratrix' Bivens 0 cause of action was
governed by federal common law rather than by state statutes and
that the action survives even if state law did not permit survival.8'
In reviewing the cases on record, particularly the Robertson
case, we can determine what the Court tells us about the
inconsistency clause of § 1983. I do believe that Banks is a great,
compelling case, and very well written. Nevertheless, it puts forth
an incorrect approach for an examination of the inconsistency
clause.
Robertson is a famous case. The plaintiff in Robertson was
Clay Shaw, a New Orleans businessman indicted for conspiracy in
the assassination of President Kennedy. 2 After his acquittal, he
brought a bad faith prosecution case against the New Orleans
District Attorney, Jim Garrison.83 The plaintiff died during the

78

Id. at 585.

79446 U.S. 14 (1980).
8o Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
82

Carlson,446 U.S. at 24.
436 U.S. at 586.

83

Id.

81

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2014

25

Touro Law Review, Vol. 19, No. 3 [2014], Art. 7

732

TOUROLAWREVIEW

[Vol 19

pendency of the case.84 His executor "jump[ed] in" and said, "Iam
going to continue the case on the behalf of the estate."85 Louisiana
had an odd statute which, in effect, said that the action would abate
unless there was a surviving spouse, parent, or sibling, and there
were none. Thus, the action abated. The Supreme Court granted
certiorariand, in an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall,
the Court held that there was no compensation interest because
Clay Shaw was dead.86 Justice Marshall made this point:
In order to find even a marginal influence on
behavior as a result of Louisiana's survivorship
provisions, one would have to make the rather
farfetched assumptions that a state official had both
the desire and the ability deliberately to select as
victims only those persons who would die before
conclusion of the § 1983 suit (for reasons entirely
unconnected with the official illegality) and who
would not be survived by any close relatives.87
I regard this as a theory of marginal deterrence. The question that
must be raised is this: if there is additional deterrence, is the state
law struck down? The Supreme Court framed the issue relatively
narrowly under the inconsistency clause.88

84

id.

85 Id. at 586-87.
86

Id. at 594-95.

87 Robertson, 436 U.S. at 592 n.1O.

81 Id. at

594.
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PROFESSOR SCH WARTZ

7-3'3:

;z:'Professor Ch~nerinsky,; California'

hds'similir linitations, cand':I -believe!youknow' 'ar' atto-rney who'
litigatdd: one ofthese issues'in'Californi.: My recolle&ion is there
9

ar6,'coiflicting decisi6fns in 'California'tate "and district'couiuts.

The "decisions'" concerntCaliofdnii"as' limitations on :survival
damdges,

89

.

*,

."

See generally, Los Angeles.v. Superior. Court, 981 P.2d 68, 73 (Cal.

1999) (holding that survival stattite prohibiting recovery of damages for
decedent's pain and suffering or disfigurement applied to federal civil rights
City of Fontana, 818 F.2d
claim prosecuted in state court); Contra Smith v.:
potential issue whether
a
(noting
1987)
1411,1416-17 n.8 (9th Cir.
California's survival. statute -was inconsistent.-with the federal Civil-.Rights..
Act, but did not decide it); Williams v. City of Oakland, 915 F. Supp. 1074,
1076-77 (N.D. Cal 1996), (conclpding' that California survival law'. .
disaiilowance of recovery ior a deceased plainiitiffs pain and suffering, as
expressed in section 377.34, is "inconsistent with section 1983 [even in
cases]- when the 'victim's" death. :Was.. not", a;result ,of the constitutional"
violation."); Guyton v. Phillips, 532 F. Supp. 1154, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal.
198,1) (citinga line of,cases, withthe exception; f-the, first case,.by.adistrict.
court in 'California,primarily in tie Seventh'Circuit, holding that where the
civil rights violation killed the victim, the policy of the civil rights law
re'quires that-th& de edeents-estat'el *e c6m'pensated for the "value of the -loss
of the decedent's life," or the "deprivation of the pleasures of life," known as
"hedonic" damages,. and forthe'decedent's-pain andsuffering, even though a
state's survival statute does not allow such damages); Sullivan v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc. 935 P.2d 781, 784 (Cal. 1997) (stating under the common law,
by contrast, "all causes of action for personal torts abated on the death of
either the-injure.dpartyor the tortfeasor..... .");..Gar.cia.v. Superior Court,.49...
Cal. Rptr. 2d 580 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that California's survival'.
statute was not inconsistent with Constitution and laws of the United States,"
and could be borrowed for purposes of determining damages in..,§ :1.983',
.
action).
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Currently, there is a split

between the federal district courts in California and the California
Supreme Court as to what happens when somebody dies while
there is a § 1983 claim pending but the demise is not caused by the
underlying action.' ° In 1999, in the case of County of Los Angeles
v. Los Angeles Superior Court,9 the California Supreme Court
held that if a person dies while the claim is pending and the death
is unrelated to the lawsuit, the claim is abated.92 If a case is
pending and the plaintiff dies, and the death was unrelated to the
facts of the case (an unrelated accident), the California Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs death ended the matter.

The

opposing parties cited cases from several federal district courts in
California which all held that a death unrelated to the underlying
cause of action does not cause the claim to abate.93 This presents a
strange situation where getting into federal court would make all
the difference to the outcome. This situation is at odds with the
Erie Doctrine, as articulated by the Court in Erie Railroadv.

90

Los Angeles, 981 P.2d at 68.

91 Id.
92 Id. at 79-81.
93

Id. at 78

n.6.
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Tompkins.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

No Supreme Court decision has

resolved whether there is a right to assert a wrongful death claim
under § 1983. 9

Further, there are no Second Circuit decisions,

although several other circuits have decisional law in this area.95
In Banks, the focus was on wrongful death under § 1983.

One

possible resolution is for the plaintiff to assert a supplemental state
law wrongful death claim.

9 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U.S. 171, 172 (1977) holding:
Although we are urged to consider the merits of the Court of
Appeals' holding, we are unable to do so, because this suit
does not now present a live "case or controversy." This suit
was brought to determine the police officers' liability for the
death of appellee's son. That issue has been decided, and there
is no longer any possible basis for a damages claim. Nor is
there any possible basis for a declaratory judgment. For a
declaratory judgment to issue, there must be a dispute which
"calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis,
but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts."
Here, the District Court was asked to answer the hypothetical
question whether the defendants would have been liable apart
from their defense of good faith. No "present right" of
appellee was at stake. Indeed, appellee's primary claim of a
present interest in the controversy is that he will obtain
emotional satisfaction from a ruling that his son's death was
wrongful. . . . Emotional involvement in a lawsuit is not
enough to meet the case-or-controversy requirement; were the
rule otherwise, few cases could ever become moot.
Id. (internal citations omitted)
95 See, e.g., Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 1998); Bethley
v. City of Spencer, 37 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir. 1994); Estate of Starks v. Enyart, 5
F.3d 230 (7th Cir. 1993); Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988).
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decision. First, there is an important Second Circuit case on this
issue entitled McFadden v. Sanchez.96 At the time of the suit, there
were no punitive damages available under the New York State
Estate Power and Trust Law,97 so the question was whether the
estate of the deceased could assert punitive damages under §
1983.98

In McFadden, the Second Circuit held that a plaintiff

could assert such damages.99 So, it appears to be settled law that
anything in state survival statutes that eliminates remedies is
invalid.'°° If the state survival statute does not afford punitive

710 F.2d 907 (2d Cir. 1983). In McFadden, a police officer killed
McFadden while he was resisting arrest. The decedent's estate brought a
survival claim pursuant to § 1983 against the City of New York and four police
officers, requesting punitive damages. Id. at 908. The case does not mention a
wrongful
death claim.
97
Id at 910.
96

98 Id.

99 Id at 914. The court explained:
We have no doubt that limitations in a state survival statute
have no application to a Section 1983 suit brought to redress a
denial of right that caused the decedent's death . . . to
whatever Section 1988 makes state law applicable to Section
1983 actions, it does not require deference to a survival statute
that would bar or limit the remedies available under Section
1983 for unconstitutional conduct that causes death.
Id. at 911.
'0o Id. at 914.
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damages, it is facially invalid.'°1

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:
conclusion.

This might not be an absolute

What if the state law placed some limitations on

recovery, for example, a limit of recovery to $2,000,000? There
may be some limitations that are not inconsistent with § 1983.

MR. MAAZEL:

The plaintiff in Banks asserted a state law

wrongful death claim, but as was stated, wrongful death damages
in New York State are very limited.

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:
wrongful

One difficulty with the state

death claim is that it falls under supplemental

jurisdiction,

which allows the court discretion

to decline

jurisdiction over the supplemental claim. Nevertheless, could a
federal court use § 1988 and hold that the state wrongful death
provision will be applied? This would not now become a state law
claim, it would become part of federal law.

'0 McFadden, 710 F.2d at 914.
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A number of circuits have adopted this

type of borrowing theory, unlike the constitutional theory used in
some circuits.

0

PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ:

The problem with the borrowing

theory is that when the federal court borrows state law, the federal
court is not allowed to borrow whole causes of action.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

That is correct. The federal court must

decide whether § 1988's prohibition on borrowing new and
independent causes of action is violated by the borrowing of a
wrongful death remedy.'0 2 One can argue that a wrongful death
remedy just gives survivors some additional remedial rights and
that these rights are related to the cause of action the decedent
would have been allowed.

It is evident that there are definite

problems with the borrowing approach.

102

Some federal courts have followed the borrowing approach to survival

issues and relied on § 1988(a) to borrow state wrongful death remedies. See,
e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974); Brazier v. Cherry, 293 F.2d
401 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 921 (1961).
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There is a third doctrine available,

which we can call the "Steinglass Theory." A number of years
ago, there was a law professor who wrote an award winning article
which advocated that Congress intended under § 1983 a wrongful
death cause of action.' °3

Dean Steinglass is the author of that

article.

DEAN STEINGLASS:

Actually, a great deal of the language in

Judge Marrero's opinion is consistent with that theory. However,
there is a problem with the theory; it is far too complicated. If we
were to look at the language of § 1983, there are references to the
"party injured." The prevailing assumption is that the party injured
under § 1983 is the same person whose constitutional rights are
violated. Typically, that is how we interpret statutes. Actions are
personal, and when rights are violated, the victim seeks
recompense for his injuries.
I believe that the language of § 1983 can be read
differently. We can disconnect the language; the party injured and
the person whose rights are violated need not be the same party. In

113

Steven Steinglass, Wrongful Death Actions and Section 1983, 60 IND. L. J.
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fact, it happens all the time. It occurs in cases involving third party
standing."4

I am certain that if we were to look in Professor

6
Chemerinsky's treatise, 05 we would read Singleton v. Wulff 10

Along with Wulff a number of other cases would be present in
which a doctor, for example, claims he or she was injured because
state law restricted the ability of a third party, his female clients, to
terminate pregnancies.

07

Attorney fees are awarded in those cases.

My argument is that § 1983, by its legislative history, could
be viewed as a wrongful death statute in and of itself. If that
argument was accepted, or if it was understood by anyone, it
would require federal courts to apply a measure of damages the
way they generally do in § 1983 cases. That is to say, federal rules
for damages should govern. State law would not be relevant.

559 (1985).
'04 See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
105 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Aspen Law & Business
2001).
106 428 U.S. at 106.
10 See, e.g., Marie v. McGreevey, 314 F.3d 136, 139 (3d Cir. 2002).
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